Roots of the “Renaissance:”
Federal Incentives to Urban Planning, 1941 to 1948

By Tom Hanchett


One of the most active, but least examined, periods in the development of American planning is the 1940s. During the early and middle years of the World War II decade, a remarkable enthusiasm for urban planning swept the United States. "It is probably exaggeration to say that the war production, city planning was the most popular homefront activity during the year [1944]," announced the Municipal Year Book. "Hundreds of new planning agencies were set up in cities and towns all over the country." ¹ The planning boom continued past the war's end, reaching something of a high point around 1946 --"undoubtedly," according to the Year Book, "the best year city planning has ever known in this country."² Such contemporary observations have been corroborated by historians such as Carl Abbott, Christopher Silver, Kay Haire Huggins, and Mel Scott.³ In Scott’s words, the period beginning about 1942 constituted "a nationwide renaissance in city planning."⁴

Scholars have assumed that this renaissance resulted from functional necessities and local political currents. They argue that cities felt the need to plan in order to meet the considerable requirements of the war effort, which drew thousands of new factory workers into some urban centers.⁵ City administrators also feared the specter of a postwar depression such as had followed World War I, if they did not plan a smooth transition to peacetime production.⁶ Some historians also describe a "neopressive resurgence" at the local level in American cities during these years, which created a political climate more conducive to activist government.⁷

These explanations are consonant with the widely accepted notion that the federal government did little for city planning in the years between the New Deal and the Wagner-Ellender-Taft Housing Act of 1949. Mel Scott, Phillip Funigiello, and others portray the mid-1940s as a nadir of federal support for urban planning.⁸ Looking largely at the actions of Congress, they stress the discontinuation of the National Resources Planning Board (NRPB), the New Deal agency that had held forth the promise of nationally centralized planning. They also emphasize the many defeats
suffered by the planning legislation that would eventually emerge after 1949 as urban renewal. About the only influence that Washington exercised over urban planning in the 1940s, they suggest, was through the how-to publications distributed by the short-lived NRPB.

Although functional needs and local political climate undoubtedly did contribute to the planning renaissance, close examination will show that federal incentives in fact played a key role. During the early and mid-1940s, a host of programs instituted by Washington quietly prodded localities to plan. Some of the programs, particularly Federal Housing Administration (FHA) mortgage insurance and Federal Highway Act funding for urban roads, are familiar, though their impact on city planning is not well known. Other war-era programs, such as the Lanham Act with its grants for community facilities, and the War Mobilization and Reconversion Act with its financial assistance to local planning bodies, are less familiar. Seemingly unrelated federal activities, from the rationing of building materials to the regulation of airline routes, also had the effect of encouraging cities to draw up planning documents. Together, the roster of programs forged new local coalitions in favor of municipal involvement in urban development. Because business leaders, civic boosters, and real estate developers realized that such actions would bring federal largess, they pushed city governments to step up planning and zoning work. This national phenomenon, and its workings in one particular municipality, the city of Charlotte, North Carolina, are the subject of this chapter.

World War II as a Spur to Local Planning

Many of the federal incentives to urban planning in the 1940s came as part of the effort to gear the country up for World War II. The Lanham Act stands as a prime example. Congress passed the Lanham Act in 1940 initially as a military housing measure, to fund the building of federally owned housing at military bases and at key industrial sites. In June of 1941, however, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt signed an amendment to the Lanham Act allocating $150 million to construct "community facilities" for defense workers. These public works grants could be used anywhere that war-related activities were taking place -- which meant nearly everywhere in the United States.

Between 1941 and 1946, the Lanham Act funded some four thousand public works projects in cities and towns throughout the country. These included 1,149 schools, 905 water and sewer facilities, 874 hospitals, 776 recreation facilities, 160 fire and police stations, 90 child care facilities, and 86 street and highway projects. Some, typically those facilities that served federal installations, were constructed entirely with federal money. In more than half of the projects, though, the local government made a contribution. In those cases, which accounted for 61 percent of the grants, the municipality received title to the completed project.
Mayors welcomed the Lanham Act as the best thing since the New Deal’s public works grants, but they found that the application process carried more stringent requirements. The Public Works Administration (PWA) and Works Progress Administration (WPA) of the 1930s had represented Washington’s first serious forays into funding local projects. The primary goal of both the PWA and WPA was to do some economic "pump-priming" and put people to work. Consequently federal officials approved almost any project if it spent money and promised high employment. With the Lanham Act, grant rules became stiffer. Mayors now needed to prepare planning documents to demonstrate that their localities urgently required particular public works, and they had to show how the facilities would serve industries and workers.

To help municipalities meet these requirements, Congress eventually added a sister program explicitly designed to underwrite planning. The War Mobilization and Reconversion Act signed in 1944 authorized loans to help states and cities draw up public works plans. Such plans would assist with wartime grant projects and also aid in the transition back to a civilian economy, according to an agency report. "By putting the plans into operation 'when the extra-ordinary private demands [for construction] begin to run out,'" the report explained, "it should be possible to contribute substantially to the stabilization of the construction industry, an important sector of the American economy, and provide much useful employment at a time when it may be badly needed."13

During its short life, the Reconversion Act underwrote planning in thousands of communities. Over a period of a little more than three years, staffers approved a whopping 7,338 "applications for repayable planning advances," making more than $61 million in loans to states and cities.14 The loans proved so popular with local governments that the Federal Works Agency began to hope that the program might continue even after economic recovery from World War II was complete. Congress, however, held with its original intent and terminated funding in 1947.15

At the same time that the Lanham Act and Reconversion Act promoted planning of "community facilities," another war-related program quietly encouraged planning for both public works and housing. In April 1942 the U.S. War Production Board added building materials to its list of rationed items, along with gasoline, tires, and consumer foodstuffs. Conservation Order L-41 put virtually all-civilian construction, public and private, under federal control. As one government report stated dramatically, "Decisions to build houses or not to build houses became war decisions."16

A consortium of federal agencies carried out the program for rationing building materials, and it explicitly made local planning a main requirement for getting supplies. The War Production Board decided what fractions of the nation’s building materials stock could be devoted to particular uses. Once those basic figures were set, the National Housing Agency (NHA) and the Federal Housing Administration
took over the task of specifying which communities would get what. The NHA and FHA officials based their decisions on planning documents submitted by local governments. "The important thing at this stage of the game," emphasized the NHA's 1943 annual report, "is to get the localities to ... lay plans now for getting better housing for better living through better neighborhoods, and to encourage them to think of total housing need in an area so that the parts of their local goals will fit together and make sense." 17

Rationed building materials went largely for federally owned defense projects at first, but permitted uses gradually expanded over the course of the war. As pressing demands were filled, supplies became available for local public works. Mayors found they could win allocations if they submitted documents demonstrating that a city school or sewer plant would serve war workers. By the last months of the war, scarcities eased to such an extent that the NHA began to release supplies "to meet housing needs that [had] piled up in congested areas and which were impeding war production." 18 Developers' ears perked up. Since nearly all urban areas had some military manufacturing, virtually every city in the country could qualify. In all, the NHA authorized more than thirty thousand units of this civilian "H-2" housing during 1944 and 1945. The allocations were parceled out in small amounts -- two hundred houses to this community, five hundred to that one -- encouraging hundreds of communities to submit the necessary planning documents. 19

**Nondefense Incentives to Local Planning in the 1940s**

Complementing these various wartime initiatives were a number of nondefense programs that offered additional incentives for local planning. Two Washington agencies, the Public Roads Administration and the new Civil Aeronautics Board, focused on urban transportation. The FHA, meanwhile, implemented regulations that encouraged cities to draw up land-use plans and corollary documents including subdivision regulations and zoning ordinances.

For American cities, perhaps the most important transportation initiative from Washington in the 1940s was the Federal Aid Highway Act of 1944. 20 This legislation would subsequently be overshadowed by the Highway Act of 1956, which created America's interstate expressway system. The 1944 act, though smaller, nonetheless stands as a landmark in urban transportation. Federal money had been flowing for highway construction since 1916, and planning dollars had been available to states since 1935. But for cities, the 1944 act represented a "new departure in Federal high way legislation," in the words of officials at the Public Roads Administration. Over a three-year period it earmarked $125 million specifically for urban roads, making possible "for the first time with federal aid the correction of highway defects in the cities which now constitute the most troublesome traffic bottlenecks" (figure 12.1). 21

The 1944 act specifically set aside money for planning. "Comprehensive surveys of traffic needs in urban areas, hitherto an almost untouched area, have been inaugurated," an agency report announced. Much of the actual work was carried out in Washington, but when possible the feds sought to bolster local planning agencies, making it a policy to "delegate to cities and counties the planning and design work on federal-aid jobs wherever adequate staff is available." During its first two years, the program helped initiate or conduct surveys in fifty metropolitan areas all over the United States, ranging from such big cities as St. Louis and Denver to small communities including Ottumwa, Iowa, and Charlotte, North Carolina.
Even as Washington inaugurated aid to urban highway planning, another federal program was having the effect of encouraging planning for air transportation. Across the nation, the construction of urban airports had received a boost from the PWA grant program of the late 1930s. To cope with the mushrooming number of airfields, the newly created Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) set up an elaborate hearing process to award airline routes. Beginning in 1938, an airline company seeking a route had to submit briefs to the CAB demonstrating service needs and estimating the number of passengers likely to board at each stop.

Mayors who desired additional air service for their cities discovered that chances improved if they filed supporting documents with the Civil Aeronautics Board in the airlines' behalf. One such filing in 1944 included data on "population, industrial trends, manufacturing output, banks and bank clearings, wholesale and retail sales, railway and bus transportation, rainfall, highway facilities, distribution center, hotel registration and dozens of other sets of facts and figures, including present air transport services." The preparation of such reports not only involved cities in air transportation planning, but also made mayors assemble the sort of data, maps, and charts that would form the foundation of a full-scale city plan.

Along with promoting the planning of highways and airports, federal incentives pushed local governments to take on land-use issues. The chief agency in this effort was the Federal Housing Administration. Founded in 1934 as part of the New Deal, the FHA sought to aid the American housing industry by underwriting mortgage insurance for homebuyers. Historians have long recognized that FHA mortgage policy spurred the rapid suburbanization that reshaped American cities beginning in the late 1940s. Recently, historians have begun to document other far-reaching side effects of FHA policies, from the "red-lining" of America's inner cities to the growing dominance of large-scale "community builders" over the housing industry. The agency, it is becoming clear, also exercised considerable influence over urban planning and land-use regulation.

The \textit{FHA Underwriting Manual}, first published in the late 1930s, stated that the administration would use eight criteria in deciding whether to back mortgages in a particular neighborhood:

1. relative economic stability (weighted 40 percent)
2. protection from adverse influences (20 percent)
3. freedom from special hazards (5 percent)
4. adequacy of civic, social, and commercial centers (5 percent)
5. adequacy of transportation (10 percent)
6. sufficiency of utilities and conveniences (5 percent)
7. level of taxes and special assessments (5 percent)
8. appeal (10 percent)
The most insurable communities were those in which local laws and planning procedures helped guarantee "relative economic stability," "protection from adverse influences," "adequacy of transportation," and the rest. The administration's 1938 Circular No. 5: SUBDIVISION STANDARDS for the Insurance of Mortgages on Properties Located in Undeveloped Subdivisions, for example, specifically included zoning and subdivision regulations among its "Minimum Requirements." Although technically it could not mandate local ordinances, the FHA emphasized that its loan evaluators would "insist upon the observance of rational principles of development in those areas in which insured mortgages are desired."

A pair of defense-related events in 1942 and 1944 sharply increased the impact of these FHA "recommendations." The fact that the FHA played a key role in administering building materials rationing starting in 1942 meant that most of America's residential construction came under its purview for the duration of the war. Between 1942 and 1945, well over half of the new houses in the country were built with FHA-insured mortgages. Real estate men began in earnest to press municipalities to set up planning boards and enact the necessary laws.

The pressure stepped up in 1944. In that year, the Veterans Administration (VA) instituted its generous mortgage-insurance plan, which allowed returning GIs to borrow the entire price of a house (up to $2,000) with no down payment. Though administered separately, the VA effort was closely tied to the FHA program. Nearly a fifth of the 2.1 million loans insured during the first five years of the VA effort were second mortgages supplementing an FHA first mortgage. With tens of thousands of potential VA/FHA sales at stake, builders all over the United States lobbied their local elected officials to put planning and zoning and subdivision regulations swiftly into place.

One City's Experience

Before this roster of federal incentives set the stage for the American planning "renaissance" of the 1940s, the community of Charlotte, North Carolina, had shied away from anything resembling a city plan. The Queen City was one of a number of "New South" railroad towns that had blossomed in the Dixie upcountry following the Civil War. Charlotte grew as a wholesale and banking hub for the burgeoning Southern textile belt, a manufacturing region that covered the Carolina piedmont and extended into Virginia and Georgia. By 1940 the town ranked as the largest urban place in North and South Carolina, with 100,899 people. Like many midsized cities, especially in the South, Charlotte proudly maintained a tradition of minimal local government. Throughout the early decades of the twentieth century, civic leaders and real estate men alike actively opposed the notion that municipal government should be involved in planning.
That opposition came notwithstanding the fact that Charlotte had been an early leader in the South in the practice of neighborhood design. During the 1910s two local developers hired the famed Olmsted Brothers and their noted Boston competitor John Nolen to plan the elegant naturalistic Dilworth and Myers Park suburbs. Nolen's protégé, Earle Sumner Draper, stayed on in Charlotte to become the first professionally trained planner resident in the Southeast. Although Charlotte's businessmen liked the seclusion of winding residential avenues, they showed a strong antipathy to schemes that involved public expenditure or regulation. In 1917 one influential citizen managed to talk the Chamber of Commerce into hiring John Nolen to conduct a "Civic Survey" of existing conditions, but the chamber subsequently refused to pay Nolen to expand that preliminary document into a city plan. In 1930 an eager-beaver city manager tried again, bringing New Jersey consultant Herbert Swan to town to draw up a zoning map and master plan. Citizens rose up in arms, with some of the loudest objections coming from suburban developers. F. C. Abbott, "dean of Charlotte's real estate dealers," attacked zoning as "a serious damage to all property owners," and another leading developer threatened to seek a restraining order. Zoning opponents showed similar anger toward planning, applauding a public hearing speaker who declared, "These people down here are opposed to the government being grandmother to the citizens of Charlotte." The city council not only shelved Swan's work before it was completed but fired the city manager for good measure.

As the 1930s drew to a close, Charlotte had no city plan nor planning office. There were no zoning regulations, and no governmental involvement in housing. Local officials were so reluctant to take a hand in development that the city possessed only the most rudimentary of building codes, regulating little more than basic fire safety, and exerting no control over such things as subdivision creation, street layout, or even plumbing in existing buildings.

The first stirrings of change in Charlotte came in the late 1930s and early 1940s, as a result of initiatives begun under the New Deal. The Wagner-Steagall Act -- passed by Congress in 1937 as America's first major federal housing legislation -- offered loans to cities to build public housing. In Charlotte, the local Business and Professional Women's Club directed an exposé of slum conditions, which succeeded in convincing city fathers to construct two Wagner-Steagall housing projects in 1940. The effort had two important side effects. For one thing, Charlotte conducted its first survey of housing conditions and discovered that nearly one-fifth of the city's housing stock was seriously substandard. For another, the newspaper photos and survey figures began to impress Charlotte voters with the need for a more activist government. In 1941 a candidate named Herbert Baxter jumped into the mayor's race promising energetic progressive leadership, a marked contrast to his opponent's traditional minimal-government platform. The contest itself showed that change was in the air; normally Charlotte's political "kingmakers" anointed a candidate who ran unopposed. Baxter lost the election by a narrow margin, but events at the national level soon would tip things in his favor.
In December 1941 the United States entered World War II. For a handful of Southern cities -- particularly the naval centers of Norfolk and Mobile -- the conflict meant hard times on the homefront as municipalities struggled to cope with the deluge of newcomers who poured in seeking work in defense plants. To most towns, though, including Charlotte, the war was more an economic blessing than a curse. The feds enlarged Charlotte’s municipal airport as Morris Field, a small airbase. An abandoned Ford Motor Company plant became a bustling Army Quartermaster Depot. United States Rubber built a large facility south of town to assemble shells for navy guns. The three installations, plus the defense contracts secured by local manufacturers, never overwhelmed Charlotte’s ability to provide services and housing. The population grew by 33 percent during the decade of the 1940s, a respectable rate of increase but one that actually fell below the city’s average growth rate of 49 percent per decade during the twentieth century.

Although the war did not put much of a strain on the town, it did add momentum to the growing desire for activist -- "neoprogressive" -- government. As the feds instituted new regulations and grant programs aimed at retooling the nation’s economy for war work, business leaders in cities across the United States discovered that an energetic mayor could work wonders with Washington. In Charlotte, Herbert H. Baxter fit that job description perfectly. President of the posh Myers Park Country Club and a dealer in construction supplies, he enjoyed the respect of the city’s conservative elite. But he was also a man with an innate enthusiasm for change, whose favorite expression became "Let’s stick the needle in them and get things moving." In 1943, with the national war effort in full swing, Baxter ran for mayor again and captured the election "on the promise that he would do everything possible to lead a progressive government at city hall and ... initiate measures that [would] put Charlotte in the position at the end of the war to begin a program of improvement and expansion."

In office, Mayor Baxter aggressively sought out new Washington programs and worked hard to get Charlotteans to do what was required to take advantage of them. Among Baxter’s earliest actions in office was to spur the city to draw up public works plans and send them to Washington as a means of procuring rationed construction supplies to update the Charlotte sewerage disposal system and construct a new incinerator. Subsequently Baxter helped win Reconversion Act money to prepare plans for new sewer lines and a disposal plant. With an eye toward the Lanham Act, the mayor talked the Board of Aldermen into commissioning studies of the city’s needs for new libraries and parks. Baxter devoted considerable energy to getting federal rationing officials to release construction materials under the H-2 civilian housing program. The mayor secured the assistance of the U.S. Census Bureau, which conducted a careful survey of Charlotte’s existing housing; Baxter then hand-carried the study to Washington, where he lobbied successfully to win H-2 permits for 235 new houses. To bring more airline service to Charlotte, Baxter assisted in the filing of briefs with the Civil
Aeronautics Board.\textsuperscript{48} When the Federal Highway Act passed in 1944, Baxter worked with state officials to ensure that Charlotte would receive planning and construction assistance. One of the fruits was a joint city-state study of Charlotte traffic patterns, the town's first such effort.\textsuperscript{49} Soon after, the city hired a local engineer to draw up Charlotte's first thoroughfare plan, "To Support Bid for U.S. Funds," a newspaper headline explained (figure 12.2).\textsuperscript{50}

\begin{figure}
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\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{majorstreetplan-1949.png}
\caption{As a result of new federal incentives, Charlotte drew up its first thoroughfare plan in 1946: "To Support Bid for U.S. Funds," a newspaper headline explained. The street scheme was subsequently included in the city's first comprehensive planning document: \textit{A Masterplan Outline for Charlotte} (1949).}
\end{figure}
Because they realized that such documents could bring federal dollars, Charlotte business leaders and civic boosters began looking favorably on the notion of municipal planning. In 1943 the Charlotte Chamber of Commerce formed a committee to consider the matter, and the following spring it issued a report calling for a "postwar planning" effort in the city. 51 "Unless Charlotte takes such action," the report cautioned, "this city may find itself at a disadvantage [alongside competing cities] when the war is ended and the period of postwar development begins." 52 The chamber report focused largely on projects that were becoming eligible for federal dollars -- public works, transportation, parks, schools, libraries, and health facilities. "We can hold our own ... without assistance," said the chamber, acknowledging the position of many business conservatives. But, the report argued, if "the Federal Government should appropriate funds for all and sundry projects, let us have plans for worthwhile projects ready." 53

Initially, the Chamber of Commerce assumed that it, not the City, would handle this planning. In the past, chambers had acted as planning bodies in many municipalities, and indeed it had been the Charlotte chamber that had sponsored the aborted John Nolen planning effort back in 1917. 54 The notion fit well into Charlotte's tradition of minimalist government. But with the welter of new federal programs requiring attention, and with the lure of federal planning funds available to municipalities through the Reconversion Act, even conservative businessmen began to concede that a private agency could not do the job. Late in 1944 the chamber committee submitted a second report, recommending that a city-sponsored body take over the task. On 20 December 1944 Mayor Herbert Baxter appointed the first Charlotte Planning Commission. 55

Once created, the planning commission picked up support from an unexpected quarter: Charlotte's real estate men. Two circumstances brought these former opponents into the fold. One was the developers' desire to get the city into compliance with FHA/VA underwriting regulations. The other was the announcement that Mayor Baxter might soon apply for a second round of federal public housing. Developers feared public housing as unfair competition with their lucrative rental market; planning might offer strategies to stave off that threat to private enterprise. In February 1945 the Charlotte Real Estate Board put forth its own proposal to eradicate substandard dwellings. "These slum conditions were caused by lack of planning in the past," they asserted, executing a blithe about-face from their position of the 1930s. 56 The solution to slums was not public housing. Rather, the city planning commission should create a "standard house ordinance" mandating indoor plumbing, electric lights, and the like, and it should regulate the lay-out of new subdivisions to prevent bad conditions in the future. 57
Mayor Baxter welcomed the powerful real estate men into his planning coalition. He dropped the public housing proposal and appointed a realtor and a prominent contractor to round out the new Charlotte Planning Commission. The body settled into its work, taking over the execution of Baxter’s library, park, and transportation initiatives. In accordance with the 1944 Chamber of Commerce report, the commission also worked to establish recreation centers for returning servicemen and build a YMCA for the city’s Black population. The bulk of the commission’s time, though, turned out to be taken up with housing and land-use matters -- things that the chamber report had never mentioned.

Indeed, the notable achievements of the Charlotte Planning Commission during its first three years all sprang from FHA requirements. In 1945 the commission created a "standard house" ordinance for the city. Despite the talk about ending slum conditions, it covered only new construction, helping to guarantee "freedom from adverse influences" in the suburban neighborhoods where developers sought FHA and VA mortgages. In 1946 the commission approved a subdivision ordinance, which fulfilled FHA recommendations by establishing minimum street widths and lot sizes in new developments and setting up a review process to ensure compliance. In 1947 the planning commission fulfilled another major FHA requirement when it wrote Charlotte’s first zoning ordinance. The accomplishments showed the influence of the Real Estate Board and, even more so, the power of federal incentives in shaping urban planning.

By the end of the 1940s Charlotte could boast most of the hallmarks of progressive planning. The city had a zoning board and a subdivision ordinance. It at last possessed a building code that mandated not just fire-safe but habitable dwellings. A busy planning commission was about to hire a professional director, and work was under way on A Master Plan Outline for Charlotte, the town’s first comprehensive plan. The document clearly showed the effects of incentives offered by Washington during the decade. Sections on sewer and water needs came out of work begun in order to get rationed building materials and continued under the Reconversion Act. Pages on parks and libraries were drawn from the studies inspired by the Lanham Act. The influence of the Civil Aeronautics Board was evident in sketches for airport improvements, while the 1944 Highway Act and the FHA’s mandate for suburban "adequacy of transportation" shaped the maps depicting a comprehensive thoroughfare system. In barely ten years’ time, a city that had once shunned planning had come to embrace the notion that local government should take an active role in guiding development.

A Boom in Municipal Planning

Similar enthusiasm for planning took hold simultaneously in hundreds of localities across the United States. At the start of the 1940s most of the nation’s larger cities
claimed to have planning and zoning bodies, but many of these were in name only. After a period of popularity in the 1920s, many citizen planning groups had ceased to function. Those towns claiming to have a planner on staff often simply added such duties to the job description of an already busy engineer or building inspector. Kenneth Schellie, director of the Indiana Economic Council, summarized the situation in his home state, and by extension in many others: "City planning and zoning acts have been on the state law books since 1921; the county planning enabling act since 1935, and yet it is difficult, if not impossible to point to any municipality or county which has made any real progress in planning action."63 Indeed, a survey published in 1942 by the International City Managers Association showed that fully half the cities in the United States had spent nothing on city planning during the previous year.64 Even in America’s largest metropolitan centers, outlay for planning was often minimal -- San Francisco’s department, for instance, consisted of just three people at the dawn of the decade, one of them a stenographer.65

This lethargy dissolved as Washington’s planning incentives kicked in. The American Society of Planning Officials (ASPO) devoted its 1944 conference to the outpouring of activity in postwar planning. Profiles of twenty-four communities, ranging from New York City to Waukegan, Illinois, conveyed an air of excitement. "The war," said Frank O’Malley, director of the Boston City Planning Board, "has made planning socially acceptable."66 Alfred Bettman, chair of the Cincinnati Planning Commission, marveled at his city council’s turnaround after twenty-five years of meager funds: "Participating in the present burst of enthusiasm for what is called postwar planning, the council has appropriated $100,000 directly to the planning commission, with the promise that the appropriation will be repeated when more is needed."67 Likewise, reported another speaker, in Toledo and surrounding Lucas County, Ohio, local planning budgets had jumped from $10,000 to $45,000. Communities that did not already have planning agencies now launched them. At the 1944 ASPO conference, Philadelphia’s Robert Mitchell announced that his city was creating a new central planning office, which would soon employ thirty-four people. From Kansas, John Picton noted that "with greatly increased appropriation for planning activities in Kansas City we have assembled staff and made a start toward preparing a masterplan."68

The wave of enthusiasm continued through the years immediately after the war, as more and more communities moved to create planning departments or pump resources into existing ones. At ASPO’s 1948 conference, for instance, Russell VanNest Black rose to report that in New Jersey, "four years ago none of the State’s cities with a population of 100,000 or more had an active planning board. Now all are engaged in intensive planning programs, or are about to do so."69 Across the country, in California, thirty-one agencies sprang up in 1947 and 1948 alone, mostly in towns and counties previously considered too small to warrant a planning office.70 At the opposite end of the population scale, San Francisco experienced a similar "awakening." By 1948 the annual planning budget there had increased from

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barely $15,000 to "$126,000 for the general program, $16,000 for zoning revision, and $140,000 for the transportation plan," and the three-person office had mushroomed into a staff of twenty-six. Zoning work, in particular, emerged as a major focus all over America in these years. During the half-decade following announcement of the VA mortgage program in 1944, fully 50 percent of American cities with over 10,000 population wrote new zoning ordinances.

The buzz of activity heralded a new era for the planning profession. During the 1940s the day-to-day work of local planning shifted away from citizen boards, chambers of commerce, and consultants. Henceforth, most planning would be done by full-time professional planners on local government payroll. Membership in the American Society of Planning Officials rose steadily through the decade, nearly doubling in the 1940-45 period alone. Perhaps the most impressive evidence of the new municipal commitment to planning came in city budgets. Back in 1936 only 39 cities had spent as much as $5,000 a year on planning, the minimum needed to support one full-time professional and a stenographer. That number climbed gradually to 57 cities in 1941, then zoomed to 110 by 1948. Growth was most impressive in medium-size towns. In 1941 barely one-third of cities with 100,000 to 250,000 in population budgeted as much as $5,000 for planning. Seven years later the proportion was up to two-thirds. Overall, the total amount of money that all American towns with a population of more than 25,000 spent on planning rose from $1.2 million in 1941 to $3.8 million in 1948, an increase of 323 percent.

An Incomplete Coalition

The quantity of planning activity jumped dramatically during the 1940s as localities rushed to fund planning agencies. But what of quality? What effect did this era of federal incentives have on the plans that municipalities produced? Historians, as well as commentators in the period, have found much to criticize in the planning work of the decade. Charlotte's 1949 master plan provided a case in point. For all its handsome drawings, it was more a project list than a unified plan. It said nothing about such matters as public transportation or creating decent housing for the poor. The document offered no overarching vision of the city's future, of how Charlotte might become a better place for all its citizens to live. Such shortcomings were typical of planning work nationwide during the 1940s. Most urban plans of the decade were "narrow in conception and results," a "pragmatic postwar planning with active business participation ... rather than planning for social betterment."

The reason for the weaknesses as well as the strengths that characterized American urban planning in the 1940s can be found in the federal incentives that spurred this period of growth. The new programs lured mayors, boosters, businessmen, and real estate developers to the planning table by offering juicy possibilities for economic gain. Responding to the incentives, local movers and shakers forged coalitions that
proved extremely effective in making planning a municipal priority. Washington’s actions, in short, were geared precisely toward "active business participation." The incentives put the planning focus on new highways, suburban subdivisions, and public works, not on broader "social betterment." Federal programs contained little if anything that encouraged businessmen to consider the interests of citizens who stood outside the economic power structure. In Charlotte, Black Bishop Buford G. Gordon angrily noted the imbalance soon after the city planning commission began its work: "It is evident, from the published proposals and from the organizational structure of those sponsoring the post-war plannings for Charlotte, that the post-war world will be the conservation and extension of the exact pattern, only enlarged, of the present world order, with its ... undemocratic customs and traditions."78

Such criticisms would grow louder during the era of urban renewal and interstate highway construction in the 1950s and 1960s. The narrow planning coalitions assembled during the 1940s in America’s towns and cities stood ready to control the local use of this gushing stream of federal dollars. Only much later, in response to the destruction often wrought by these mammoth plans, would Washington take steps to mandate full "citizen participation" in planning -- which entailed public hearings and consultation with affected residents.79 In many respects, the requirements for citizen participation that came in the 1960s and 1970s would finally complete the transformation of local planning begun a generation earlier by the federal incentives of the 1940s.

NOTES


-- Mary Corbin Sies and Christopher Silver, editors of the original publication


9. Though federal involvement in urban planning in the 1940s has almost unanimously downplayed by historians and planning scholars, political scientists who specialize in the field of "intergovernmental relations" identify the 1940s as the start of the modern "grants economy," characterized by "the use of intergovernmental grants-in-aid by one government (especially the federal government) to stimulate, support or otherwise influence the policy decisions of another government." Wright 1990, p. 62; 1988, pp. 71-77.


11. Federal Works Agency 1946, p. 149; 1948, p. 34.


15. Ibid.


24. Highway plans were drawn up for Atlanta; Baltimore; Baton Rouge; Bay Area, California; Boston; Charlotte; Charleston, South Carolina; Chattanooga; Cincinnati; Clinton, Iowa; Columbus, Georgia; Denver; Fort Wayne, Indiana; Greenville, South Carolina; Harrisburg, Pennsylvania; Indianapolis; Jacksonville, Florida; Johnson City, Tennessee; Kalamazoo; Kansas City, Missouri; Lincoln, Nebraska; Little Rock; Macon, Georgia; Mason City, Iowa; Memphis; Milwaukee; Muskegon, Michigan; Nashville; Newark; New Orleans; Oklahoma City; Omaha; Ottumwa, Iowa; Port Huron; Portland, Oregon; Providence, Rhode Island; Richmond, Virginia; St. Joseph, Missouri; St. Louis; Salt Lake City; Savannah; Seattle; Shreveport; South Bend, Indiana; Spokane; Spartanburg, South Carolina; Springfield, Missouri; Tampa; Tulsa; Waycross, Georgia. Federal Works Agency 1946, p. 66.


29. Federal Housing Administration 1938, p. 8. For background on the concept of municipal subdivision regulations, see Burnham 1991.

30. Federal Housing Administration 1938, p. 3; Weiss 1987, p. 150.


32. Wheaton 1953, p. 376; Jackson 1985, pp. 204-5; Wright 1981,
33. A small farm community from its founding in the 1750s until the rail era of the 1850s, Charlotte grew rapidly after the Civil War and surpassed the old colonial port of Charleston to become the Carolinas' population leader in 1930. Hanchett 1985a, pp. 68-76.

34. Hanchett 1993, chaps. 6 and 7; Kratt and Hanchett 1986; Hanchett 1985b.

35. John Nolen Papers, Folders 4 and 5, box 98. See especially Nolen to Black, 29 Sept. 1917. The sole extant copy of the 1917 "Civic Survey for Charlotte" is in the Nolen Papers. Charlotte's reluctance seems to have been part of a regional pattern. Brownell notes that Southerners were less enthusiastic about urban plans than were non-Southerners during the profession's boom years of the 1910s and 1920s. Brownell 1975a, pp. 343-44. On planning in the South, see also Silver 1987, pp. 371-83; Chapin 1954, pp. 268-82; Brownell 1975b, pp. 172-89.

36. Charlotte News, 5 Sept. 1930; Social Science Research Council 1939, p. 7. No copies of Swan's plan have been located.


38. The study counted some 4,500 dwellings that urgently needed plumbing, heat, or other major basic improvements. Charlotte City Council Minutes, 23 Sept. and 30 Nov. 1938; Charlotte Observer, 15 Feb. 1945. By comparison, the city's total housing stock was 25,402 units in 1940. Charlotte News, 9 Feb. 1945.


40. A Committee on Congested Production Areas, established by FDR in 1943, aided those cities that were particularly hard-pressed, a total of eighteen across the United States. Charlotte was not among them. Daniel 1990, pp. 899-911.


44. *Charlotte Observer*, 21 Apr., 1 June 1944. Earlier the city won allocation of rationed materials to rebuild Villa Heights School, which had burned early in the war. *Charlotte Observer*, 7 May 1944.


51. Roberts 1944a.


53. Roberts 1944a, p. 29.


60. Charlotte City Council Minutes, 29 Jan. 1946.


63. Schellie 1945.

64. Blucher 1942.


66. Bettman et al. 1944.

67. Ibid.

68. Ibid.


70. Walker 1941, p. 348.


73. ASPO Newsletter 15 (10): 85.


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